Ten Years After . . . Transition and Economics by GÈrard Roland
Ten Years After . . . Transition and Economics
GÉRARD ROLAND*
This paper attempts to portray a synthesis of what has been learned in the past 10
years with regard to the transition process. It contrasts the mainstream
“Washington consensus” view of transition with the “evolutionary institution-
alist” perspective. It argues that the latter gives a more adequate and complete
picture both of the transition processes and of economic systems and is of better
help to prevent serious transition failures. [JEL P10, P16, P41, P51, P52]
M
ore than 10 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the beginning of tran-
sition in former socialist countries, it is useful to try to gather some of the
lessons that have been learned with respect to our vision of the transition process
and also with respect to how transition processes have affected our way of thinking
about capitalism as an economic system. Transition issues have appeared initially
quite controversial. There have been controversies on the speed of reforms, priva-
tization methods, the role and organization of government, the kind of financial
system needed, etc. While these controversies often have been seen as ideological,
they also reflect to a large extent the initial ignorance and unpreparedness of the
economics profession with respect to the large-scale institutional changes implied
by the transition from socialism to capitalism.
When the Berlin Wall fell unexpectedly, there was indeed no preexisting
theory of transition. We had no preexisting theory on the effects of political
constraints on transition strategies, the effects of liberalization in socialist
economies with no preexisting markets, how to privatize socialist enterprises
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comments.given the legacies left by socialism, and how to harden budget constraints and
achieve efficient restructuring.
Not surprisingly, transition brought many unexpected surprises:
• The huge output fall after price liberalization, which was not predicted by
the economics profession at large nor by scholars of economic systems.
• The continuous economic decline in Russia and other countries of the
former Soviet Union and the divergence in economic performance between
Central Europe and most countries of the former Soviet Union.
• The extent of insider privatization.
• The observation of restructuring in many state-owned enterprises despite
initial fears of widespread asset-stripping before privatization of the
enterprise.
• The extent of the development of the Mafia phenomenon. Where we
expected the emergence of markets, often the Mafia emerged instead.
• The breakup of countries (Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, USSR, and seces-
sionist tendencies inside Russia).
• Last and not least the huge economic success of Chinese reforms, which led
to sustained growth and prosperity over a period of 20 years.
The economics profession was thus very ignorant when transition started.
What have we learned in the past ten years? I should start by stating that we
remain relatively ignorant and that there remain important disagreements among
economists doing research on transition. Ten years can be a long time in the life
of people, but in research, it is a short time span. Compared to other economic
events and issues, transition is also especially complex. Understanding transition
requires a comprehensive understanding of the constitutive elements of capitalism
and of their interactions. Moreover, it requires also an understanding of the
dynamics of large-scale institutional change, an even more difficult objective.
Nevertheless, important progress has been made by the economic research on
transition. As a result, there also has been an important convergence on many
issues. Not only have visions of transition evolved substantially in the past ten
years, but research on transition also has contributed to certain shifts of emphasis
in the way economists look at economic systems. The various surprises of transi-
tion have further contributed to a change of focus that has been taking place in the
past two decades in the vision of economics. They have very much reinforced the
institutionalist perspective, emphasizing the importance of the various institutions
underpinning a successful capitalist economy. Successful institutions of capitalism
are already present in advanced economies, and we tend to take them for granted
when reasoning on economies in transition or on developing economies where
such institutions are absent. If anything, the experience of transition shows that
policies of liberalization, stabilization, and privatization that are not grounded in
adequate institutions may not deliver successful outcomes. Much of this change of
focus toward the institutionalist perspective already had been taking place with the
development of contract theory, political economy, law and economics, regulation
theory, corporate finance, and other areas in applied economic theory. The experi-
ence from transition, however, has contributed to accelerate various changes of
focus in the way we think about economics. Thus, there is a shift of emphasis from
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ronment of contracting. Transition has not only helped to reinforce this change of
focus in economic thinking, it has also renewed interest in thinking about the inter-
play and complementarities between the various constitutive institutions of capi-
talism. Finally, transition has forced us to think about institutions not in a static
way but in a dynamic way: how momentum for reform is created, how institutions
can evolve but also how momentum can be lost, and how one can get stuck in inef-
ficient institutions. In this sense, transition has reinforced what I would call the
evolutionary-institutionalist perspective, insisting both on the institutional envi-
ronment of agents at any moment in time but also on its evolution.
I. The Washington Consensus Versus the
Evolutionary-Institutionalist Perspective
To organize the discussion, it is useful to present a simplified and schematic
presentation of the differences between the two main visions of transition that
have crystallized since the beginning of the transition process and that shaped both
policy recommendations and research programs.
The first vision of transition is generally referred to as the “Washington
Consensus.”1 I will call the second one the “evolutionary-institutionalist perspec-
tive.” One could label the former the big bang or the shock therapy view and the
latter the gradualist or incrementalist view. I prefer not to do so because these
labels are too narrow in their focus since they mainly emphasize the speed of
reforms, whereas, as we will see below, there are many more dimensions than
speed that are involved in both visions. This broadening of the focus since the
beginning of transition is the object of a consensus among researchers working on
transition on both sides. The presentation that follows is certainly schematic and
incomplete. Most researchers would not fully recognize their own vision of tran-
sition in either category, and there also has been an important degree of conver-
gence over time in many of the dimensions that I will evoke. Even though the
“Washington Consensus” is usually associated with the views of the IMF and
World Bank, the description below should in no way be seen as a description of
their official views. Views within the IMF and the World Bank, moreover, have
undergone change over time and should not be seen as monolithic.
The purpose of this presentation is thus not to draw pictures of two camps or
to draw a “straw man” but to crystallize ways of thinking about transition in a
comprehensive way. In all the dimensions of transition treated below, debates have
been taking place in the past ten years reflecting these two visions in one way or
another. These debates, and more importantly the transition experience itself, have
led to a process of learning. As of today, many fervent advocates of the Washington
TEN YEARS AFTER ...TRANSITION AND ECONOMICS
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1The term “Washington Consensus” was initially coined by John Williamson in 1990 and did not refer
at all to transition. Since then, as observed by Williamson (2000) himself, the term has taken a life of its
own. It has been used in particular to label the thinking behind IMF and World Bank orthodoxy and has
aroused controversy not only in the context of transition but also in the context of structural adjustment
programs. I will say nothing about the latter and will focus only on transition aspects.consensus would only partially recognize their views in what follows because of
the results of this process of learning. Also, the presentation of the evolutionary-
institutionalist perspective may be seen as biased because the vision presented here
already reflects the learning process that has taken place. The vision of those who,
ten years ago, were already critical of the Washington Consensus, was certainly not
as systematic as it is today. Presenting the Washington Consensus mainly as it was
expressed ten years ago and the evolutionary-institutionalist perspective as it exists
now may seem biased if one thinks in terms of analyzing a battle between camps,
but it is very useful if the main objective is to understand what we have learned
from the transition experience itself.
The Washington consensus view on transition was clearly dominant in the
beginning of the transition process in Central and Eastern Europe. It has shaped
policy recommendations and dominated thinking in international financial organi-
zations and has been supported and endorsed by famous economists from the best
universities in the world. It has influenced to a large degree economic policy in
most transition economies with the very large exception of China, which has
followed its own transition path in a very pragmatic way.2 Intellectually, it is
rooted in a combination of (1) standard neo-classical price theory; (2) standard
macroeconomics and experience of stabilization policy; and (3) a broad body of
knowledge in comparative economic systems emphasizing both the complemen-
tarity of the constitutive institutions of economic systems and the disappointing
experiences with partial reform in Central and Eastern Europe prior to the fall of
communism.
The evolutionary-institutionalist perspective has had more support in
academic circles than in international policy circles. It was clearly a minority view
in the beginning of transition but has gained more and more support over time in
light of the transition experience. Intellectually, it is rooted in (1) the institution-
alist perspective given by modern microeconomic theory and shaped by the devel-
opment of non cooperative game theory; (2) the evolutionary approach to
economics (see, for example, Murrell, 1992); and (3) a philosophical skepticism,
influenced by Hayek and Popper, with a strong emphasis on our relative ignorance
of economic and social systems and their transformation, and an emphasis on the
uncertainty associated with societal engineering and a strong aversion to any kind
of Bolshevist-style campaigning in large-scale institutional transformation.
Table 1 gives a summary and simplified presentation of these two opposed
visions (see also typologies in Murrell, 1992; and Stiglitz, 2000). Going from the
“forest” to the “tree,” we look successively at the attitude toward (1) the political
economy of reform and reform strategies; (2) allocative changes; and (3) gover-
nance changes. The former relates to the sectoral reallocations following liberaliza-
tion and their macroeconomic consequences, and the latter relates to changes at the
micro level and in particular at the level of enterprises. Some of the differences
listed in the table are less important and less acute, while others are more important.
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2Obviously, it has not influenced those governments that were mainly opposed to reform and whose
strategy was to block transition as much as possible. In contrast, Chinese reformers have sought to advance
the reform process and to bypass conservative opposition from within the Communist party. They have
been successful in doing so and have, in the process, developed an original transition path.TEN YEARS AFTER ...TRANSITION AND ECONOMICS
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A fundamental difference in both visions is the attitude toward uncertainty
with respect to the outcome of reforms. The Washington consensus emphasizes
that reform will deliver sure efficiency gains. It contains a strong faith in societal
engineering. The idea behind this is that the economics of reform is well under-
stood. Since the initial situation is characterized by fundamental inefficiencies and
since economic theory predicts that transition will deliver sure efficiency gains,
then these reforms should be implemented with the faith that the efficiency gains
will be reaped. We know that capitalism, as experienced in the United States or
Europe, has proved more successful, so it is simply a matter of copying the better
models. In contrast, the evolutionary-institutionalist perspective emphasizes the
aggregate uncertainty of transition outcomes. Aggregate uncertainty means that
aggregate, economy-wide reform outcomes may range from very positive to very
negative. In other words, economy-wide success is by no means guaranteed. We
do not know in advance whether the outcome will be closer to the West German
miracle or the Weimar republic, not to speak of the former Yugoslavia.
To be sure, the point is not whether we know what the successful models of
capitalism are, but what is the combination of ingredients that has delivered the
observed successes and how difficult it is to export those ingredients. Even in
trying to copy the better models of capitalism, things may thus go wrong. Our
understanding of these large-scale changes is still rudimentary and nothing guar-
antees that there will not be huge unexpected and undesired outcomes. There are
a huge number of coordination problems, moreover, to be solved among economic
agents. Among the huge multiplicity of equilibria implied by these coordination
problems, we do not know in advance which one will be selected and why. For
these different reasons, there is likely to be important aggregate uncertainty over
the outcomes of reform. This uncertainty will be reflected in both popular attitudes
towards reform and in decision making by policymakers.
This important difference in starting points has implications on reform strate-
gies. For the Washington Consensus view, the political economy emphasis is to
use early windows of opportunity or periods of “exceptional politics” to push
reforms through as fast as possible and to create irreversibility. In the
evolutionary-institutionalist perspective, the latter strategy may be dangerous and
lock whole countries in situations of inefficient economic outcomes that are hard
to reverse because of the irreversibilities created. (Such outcomes may break
social cohesion and generate important political instability.) The emphasis is
rather on ensuring a continuous and growing support for reforms among the popu-
lation. This implies a more gradual and experimental approach to reforms, relying
on the flexibility of experimentation, with an adequate sequencing of reforms, to
possibly reverse reforms that do not work and try other ones.
The Washington Consensus tends to reject in general any partial reform. The
idea is that any partial reform will create rents for given groups that will be threat-
ened by further reforms. Partial reforms, therefore, create constituencies that will
tend to oppose further reform, whereas this will not be the case with a compre-
hensive introduction of reforms. The evolutionary-institutionalist view is less
pessimistic about partial reform—all depends on the sequencing of reforms. While
some partial reforms may indeed stall the reform process and even lead to unnec-Gérard Roland
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Table 1. A Simplified Presentation of the Two Different Visions of Transition
Washington Consensus  Evolutionary-Institutionalist 
View Perspective
1. Political economy of 
reforms and reform strategies
Attitude toward uncertainty Insistence on sure efficiency gains; Insistence on aggregate 
faith in societal engineering uncertainty; skepticism toward
societal engineering
Political economy emphasis Use window of opportunity to  Ensure continuous and 
create irreversibility growing support for reforms
View of partial reforms Create rents that block further  Depends on sequencing: can 
reform progress either create momentum or stall
reform process
View of reform complementarities  Of absolute importance.  Very important but 
Necessity to jump-start the  comprehensiveness of initial 
market economy by simultaneous  reforms not necessary, 
introduction of all main reforms provided initial reforms can create
momentum for further reforms.
Transitional institutions can
develop and evolve gradually
toward more perfect institutions
Main support group for reforms Owners of privatized enterprises Middle class and new private sector
Focus of reforms Liberalization, stabilization,  Create institutional 
privatization underpinnings of markets to
encourage strong entrepreneurial
entry
Attitude toward institutional change Emphasis on adoption of laws Comprehensive: legal and financial




Attitude toward initial conditions Create “clean slate” conditions  Use existing institutions to 
by breaking existing Communist  prevent economic disruption 
state structure and social unrest while developing
new institutions
2. Allocative changes
Main view of markets and  Markets will develop  Importance of institutional 
liberalization  spontaneously provided  underpinnings needed to 
government does not intervene; enhance market growth: 
supply and demand as focus of  minimum legal and 
analysis contracting environment, law
enforcement, political stability,
building of business networks and
long term partnerships; contracting
agents and their institutional
environment as unit of analysis
Main attitude toward inefficient  Aggressive closing down Containment and politically 
state-owned enterprises feasible downsizing. Rely on
evolutionary development of private
sector to shrink state sector
Main view of government Weaken it as much as possible to  Role of government in law 
prevent intervention in markets enforcement and in securing
property rightsessary reversal, starting with other partial reforms may create momentum for
further reform. This will be the case especially when reform complementarities are
important.
Models of reform sequencing by Dewatripont and Roland (1995, 1997) show
that complementarities can be exploited by reformers when choosing the order of
reforms. Indeed, by starting with more popular reforms, it is possible to build
constituencies and political support for further, initially less popular reforms. The
idea is that positive uncertainty resolution enhances voters’ perception of positive
reform outcomes. In that case, when reforms are complementary, the only choices
are to go forward or go backward. Voters will thus be more prepared to move
forward in order to keep the gains from initial reforms after partial uncertainty
resolution about those reforms. Reforms should thus be ordered in a way to start
with reforms more likely to deliver good news for voters. Popular reforms should
precede less popular reforms. On the contrary, starting with reforms more likely to
hurt a majority of the population risks a backlash, since bad news on initial
reforms will build support for reform reversal.
For the Washington Consensus, complementarities in reform are of absolute
importance and are an overriding argument for a big bang approach whereby all
reforms are introduced in a simultaneous and comprehensive way.3 For the
evolutionary-institutionalist perspective, complementarities, while clearly impor-
tant, are not an overriding argument as long as sequencing of reforms can be used
to create momentum for further reforms. This difference between both visions also
has an important implication with respect to institutional reform and the introduc-
tion of new institutions.4 The Washington Consensus insists on fast introduction of
“best practice” institutions. This is not the case with the evolutionary-




Focus of privatization Fast transfer of ownership to  Emphasis on organic 
private hands via mass  development of private sector. 
privatization to break government  Emphasis on sales to outsiders 
power and jump-start market  to achieve efficient transfer of 
economy. Faith in market to  ownership from the start
ensure efficient resale
Main emphasis of government  Main emphasis is shrinking the  Reform in the organization of 
reform size of government government so as to align as 
much as possible the interests of
government bureaucrats with the
development of markets
Hardening budget constraints Exogenous policy choice that  Endogenous outcome of 
depends on political will  institutional changes
3Note that if the latter view is taken seriously, then partial reform cannot stall the reform process over
time since complementarities make partial reform inherently unstable leaving as the only choice to move
forward or backward in the reform process. It is thus inconsistent to insist both on the importance of
complementarities and of the danger of partial reforms stalling the transition process.
4We will come back in more detail below to the differences with respect to institutional reforms.institutionalist perspective. Introduction of “best practice” institutions may not be
possible for political and social reasons, and may not be necessary. The evolu-
tionary perspective implies that transitional institutions can develop that are
adequate to the initial conditions but that can gradually evolve toward more perfect
institutions. Here also, flexibility is important to prevent a lock in in inefficient
institutions that are hard to change.
A more minor point, but nevertheless with possible wide-ranging practical
consequences, is a difference in emphasis on the main support groups for reform.
The Washington Consensus emphasizes mostly the support of owners of privatized
enterprises. The idea is that fast mass privatization creates constituencies among
insiders and among those who benefit most from mass privatization to block any
reversal. That is one of the reasons for pushing for rapid privatization. Since the
owners of privatized enterprises are a minority and are not likely to be median
voters in elections, the focus is mainly on the creation of powerful lobbies for capi-
talism via mass privatization. The emphasis is clearly on interest group politics as
opposed to electoral politics (on this distinction, see Persson and Tabellini, 2000).
The evolutionary-institutionalist perspective pays more attention to the attitudes of
voters and to electoral politics. The purpose is more to rely on a broad group of
small entrepreneurs and the middle class that emerges from the entry of new enter-
prises both in urban areas and in the countryside. The idea is that the middle class
always plays an important role in democracies since voters of that group are more
likely to be pivotal in elections. This also explains a greater care for social cohe-
sion and a fear of excessive inequalities, which are likely to create more pressures
for redistribution and may generate political instability.
Let us now turn to issues related to the substance of reforms and their focus.
Here also, there are nonnegligible differences in vision. First of all, the
Washington consensus view on transition is based on liberalization, stabilization,
and privatization. At the start of this new millennium, few serious economists
dispute the need to liberalize, stabilize, and privatize. There is not much disagree-
ment either about the advantages of using shock therapy as a stabilization method
when it is politically feasible. For the evolutionary-institutionalist perspective, the
emphasis is more on the creation of the adequate institutional underpinnings of
markets to encourage a vigorous process of entry, competition, and exit. The idea
is that liberalization, privatization, and even stabilization will not necessarily
deliver the desired outcomes in the absence of such institutional underpinnings
and may lead to unpleasant surprises.
To avoid any misunderstandings, it would be completely wrong to state that
the Washington consensus has ignored institutional reform while the evolutionary-
institutionalist perspective has not. While the latter insists more on institutions
than the former, the main differences are elsewhere. The Washington consensus
emphasizes mainly the introduction of laws: adequate laws to secure private prop-
erty, rights of shareholders, creditors, and so forth. The evolutionary-institution-
alist perspective takes a more comprehensive view toward institutional conditions.
These include not only legal and financial change but also comprehensive condi-
tions of law enforcement, including reform of the organization of government and
the development of self-enforcing social norms that foster entrepreneurship, trust,
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has sometimes been derided by statements according to which it recommends that
perfect institutions should be introduced first before implementing any liberaliza-
tion or privatization. As stated above, this is not the case. The evolutionary attitude
toward institutions implies that minimum institutions underpinning market devel-
opment must be present from the beginning because these define the rules of the
game and thus place restrictions on undesired kinds of individual behavior and
because they reduce uncertainty. Adequate institutions must develop via trial and
error and must evolve over time into more perfect institutions that cannot be intro-
duced overnight.
Related to the latter question is the attitude toward the initial conditions of
reform. The Washington Consensus emphasizes the need to wipe the slate clean
by breaking as fast and as thoroughly as possible the existing Communist state
structure. The logic is one of “cavalry attack” to break any possible resistance and
sabotage to reforms by the conservative communists of the former nomenklatura.
The rhetoric uses revolutionary metaphors, and comparisons are often made
between post-Communist transition and the French revolution (see, for example,
Sachs, Woo, and Yang, 1999). This emphasis is very strong. Early in transition,
most experts on socialist economies were pushed aside and declared obsolete by
the shock therapists. Many of these new transition experts stated repeatedly that
knowledge of the former system is a liability and ignorance an asset in under-
standing transition. This “clean slate” view has found its most accomplished
implementation in East Germany where the old system was thoroughly broken up
at grand speed while West German experts came to build their own institutions on
the ashes of the old system. In contrast, the evolutionary-institutionalist perspec-
tive shies away from a revolutionary approach to transition. It emphasizes the need
to use the existing institutions to prevent economic disruption and social unrest
while developing new institutions.
We have here again an area where both sides put a strong emphasis on insti-
tutions, but the Washington Consensus insists on an uncompromising approach
and the absolute need to thoroughly destroy past institutions and directly put in
place the best imaginable institutions. This difference is related to the distinct
views about institutions. The main emphasis of the Washington Consensus on the
introduction of laws is coherent with a “clean slate” approach and a will to intro-
duce best practice institutions independently of initial conditions. On the other
hand, the more comprehensive approach of the evolutionary-institutionalist
perspective explains the greater skepticism toward import of institutions from
outside and the greater insistence on trying to guide an evolutionary and flexible
change of institutions in accordance with the initial conditions.
On allocative changes—that is, the sectorial reallocations related to price
liberalization and their macroeconomic consequences—both views differ on their
main vision of markets and liberalization. The Washington Consensus emphasizes
that markets will develop spontaneously, provided there is price flexibility and the
government does not intervene in markets. Supply and demand are the main focus
of analysis, and the main implicit theoretical tools guiding this vision are price
theory and general equilibrium theory. The evolutionary-institutionalist perspec-
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underpinnings of markets and the effect they may have on the speed of growth of
markets and entrepreneurial activity. Contracts and the relations between
contracting agents are the focus of analysis. Therefore, a strong emphasis is put on
the general environment of contracting: the minimum legal environment, security
of property rights and law enforcement, political stability, the development of
business and market networks facilitating search, the development of specific
investments in long term business relationships, and so forth.
A less important difference, though not without consequence, is related to atti-
tudes toward inefficient state-owned enterprises. The Washington Consensus
developed, early in transition, a hostile view toward state-owned enterprises,
emphasizing the need for fast privatization to prevent asset stripping and the need
to quickly close down loss-making plants and firms. Again, it was in East
Germany that this approach was implemented most thoroughly. The evolutionary-
institutionalist perspective is less aggressive and takes an attitude of containment,
gradual downsizing, and of hardening of budget constraints, taking into account
political constraints. The emphasis is more on developing a strong new private
sector to attract workers away from the state sector and to let the latter shrink grad-
ually over time.
The main view of government in transition developed by the Washington
consensus view is that of the necessity of weakening government as much as
possible to “de-politicize” the economy and to prevent intervention in markets.
The evolutionary-institutionalist perspective emphasizes the importance of
government in enforcing the law and the security of property rights. In particular,
adequate government infrastructure (police, courts) is needed to ensure that the
rules of the market game are followed. Among others, it is important to fight orga-
nized crime and racketeering. It is also important to enforce an adequate competi-
tion policy to prevent monopolization.
Turning now to governance changes, the two visions differ in their focus of
privatization policy. The Washington Consensus emphasizes the need for a fast
transfer of ownership to private hands via mass privatization to break government
power and to jumpstart the market economy. Speed is of the essence. The idea is
that any privatization is always better than maintaining government ownership so
that the benefits of fast privatization outweigh the costs in terms of possible misal-
location of assets to private individuals and groups. There is also a strong
emphasis on developing stock markets so that efficient resale of assets can take
place after privatization. In contrast, the evolutionary-institutionalist perspective
puts, in general, less emphasis on the importance of fast privatization of large
state-owned enterprises. There is a broader view of privatization not only of
existing state-owned enterprises but of privatization of the economy with, as main
element, the organic development of the private sector. In terms of privatization of
large enterprises, the emphasis is on competitive sales to outsiders to ensure effi-
cient transfer of ownership from the start. There is a great skepticism with respect
to the possibility of efficient resales given the necessarily rudimentary develop-
ment of financial institutions and markets at the beginning of transition. The latter
must necessarily evolve over time and cannot be jump-started.
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consensus view attaches less importance to this question and emphasizes mainly
the need to shrink the size of government. The evolutionary-institutionalist
perspective goes further than the simple dimension of government size and
emphasizes changes in incentives of government bureaucrats. Since government
agencies and officials can predate markets and the private sector, and since they
can be captured by interest groups such as monopolies and Mafia, it is important
to implement reforms in the organization of government so as to align, as much as
possible, the interests of government bureaucrats with the development of
markets. The idea is that markets and the private sector cannot develop in an envi-
ronment of government hostility. Adequate reform of government administration,
therefore, is needed to create more congruent interests between the private sector
and government bureaucrats.
In terms of hardening budget constraints, a dimension that has appeared more
and more important with the transition experience, there are also conceptual
differences. For the Washington consensus view, hardening budget constraints is
mainly an exogenous policy choice that depends on the political will of policy-
makers. For the evolutionary-institutionalist perspective, soft budget constraints
are related to a commitment problem. Because of this commitment problem,
exhortations to harden budget constraints may not be credible. Hardening budget
constraints must be an endogenous outcome of institutional changes designed to
create credibility for hardening.
While we have emphasized the differences between the two visions—the
Washington consensus view and the evolutionary-institutionalist perspective—it is
important to note that these are not visions that are diametrically opposed. Both
aim at introducing a successful market economy based on private ownership.
Nevertheless, these differences in vision reflect differences in the approach to
economic analysis and lead to differences in policy emphasis in several important
dimensions.
II. Broad Lessons from the Transition Experience So Far
Taking a broad view of the transition experience, it would seem at first view
that the following general assessment can be made. Central European countries
that started transition early, that are growing again, and that now face the prospect
of entry in the European Union, can be broadly seen as a success of the
Washington consensus, whereas Russia, with its dismal economic performances
throughout the 1990s, can be basically seen as a failure of that view. In contrast,
the success of Chinese transition cannot be attributed to the Washington consensus
view but can be seen as a confirmation of the evolutionary-institutionalist
perspective.
Such a broad assessment is not the object of consensus in the profession but
would seem to be an a priori no-nonsense characterization. Clearly, however, we
cannot content ourselves with such broad generalizations. A more detailed and
precise approach is required. We must look at the details of the various dimensions
of transition and see in which areas research has led to consensus views, in which
TEN YEARS AFTER ...TRANSITION AND ECONOMICS
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tively neglected.
Reform Strategies and Political Constraints.
In terms of the attitude toward uncertainty, I would claim that the facts have
vindicated the evolutionary-institutionalist perspective and proved the Washington
consensus view to be wrong. Indeed, reforms have not uniformly delivered good
outcomes or economy-wide efficiency gains. A simple look at the differences in
performance between the transition countries shows wide variation in the evolu-
tion of output, between the strong growth of the Chinese economy, the U-shaped
output evolution in Central Europe, and the continuous decline in many former
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries (see Figure 1).
One can always come up with ex post explanations for the observed evolutions
in the various countries and trace them to wrong or incomplete policies, lack of
comprehensiveness of reforms, and so forth. In practice, there have indeed been
many such cases. It is not acceptable, however, to invoke this argument to dismiss
these empirical observations. From the ex post point of view, it is nearly a
tautology to explain failures in performance by wrong or incomplete policies.
Policies are endogenous, however, and depend on political constraints. It is thus a
bit vain to lament incompleteness of reforms without taking into account existing
political constraints. More important, the policies strongly endorsed by the advo-
cates of the Washington consensus led in several dimensions to important
surprises and unexpected outcomes. This is the case for the important output fall
























Figure 1.  Real GDP Trends in Transition Economies After Liberalization
China 1983 = 100
Poland 1989 = 100
Russia 1991 = 100Another unexpected outcome is the asset-stripping that followed mass priva-
tization in Russia and the Czech Republic. Also on the downside, the development
of the Mafia, the strong increase in the size of the hidden economy in former CIS
countries, and the resistance of large Russian enterprises to tax collection were not
predicted either. On the upside, the development of Township and Village
Enterprises (TVEs) in China were also an unexpected corollary of decollectiviza-
tion. To be sure, most of these events were not predicted either by the advocates
of the evolutionary-institutionalist perspective. Most can and will be explained ex
post. Nevertheless, the importance of these large unexpected outcomes shows the
relevance of the emphasis on aggregate uncertainty. Finally, it is important to note
that an important convergence has taken place among researchers working on tran-
sition, certainly in the academic community, on the importance of aggregate
uncertainty.
In terms of the political economy emphasis, the picture is more mixed. The
Central European experience broadly appears to vindicate the Washington
consensus view. The experience in China broadly appears to vindicate the evolu-
tionary-institutionalist perspective. In a way, this should not be seen as a surprise.
While there is clearly a difference of emphasis between the two visions, the theo-
ries that have been developed (see, for example, Dewatripont and Roland, 1997;
Roland, 2000) can make sense of both observations on the basis of a basic trade-
off involved in the political economy of reforms. In other words, a strategy of
sequencing of reforms can relax the ex ante political constraints and gradually
build constituencies for further reform and thus enhance political feasibility, while
big bang can ensure more irreversibility of reforms in cases where there is a
window of opportunity, that is, where ex ante political constraints are less impor-
tant. This can be seen as fitting both with the Chinese and with the Central
European experience. Such results are derived, however, within a framework
where aggregate uncertainty is assumed. From that point of view, the Russian
experience shows the downside of the Washington Consensus view because of its
neglect of aggregate uncertainty. A window of opportunity was used to implement
mass privatization and this has been done so as to create irreversibility of reform,
but the relative irreversibility thus created has locked the Russian economy in an
inefficient situation where interest groups, who gained most from mass privatiza-
tion (the famous oligarchs), have become so powerful as to block further reform
such as tax reform, government reform, stronger law enforcement, and stronger
security of property rights (see, for example, Polishchuk, 1999; and Sonin, 1999).
This turn of events in Russia also tends to suggest that the political economy
view, relying mainly on the support of owners of privatized enterprises, was seri-
ously one-sided. Not only did this lead to capture and relative lock in, but also the
fact that a great majority of the population has suffered from the transition so far,
and has resented the strong concentration of wealth created by a privatization
process viewed as illegitimate and corrupt, is worrying both for political and
democratic stability and for the continuation of reforms.
On the effects of partial reform, I would claim that the Chinese experience
vindicates the evolutionary-institutionalist perspective that sequencing of reforms
does not necessarily stall reform progress but can be used to create momentum for
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in the state sector (see, for example, Naughton, 1995; Lin, 1992; and Qian, 1999).
While the Chinese reform process has had its ups and downs—its periods of fast
progress and periods of stagnation in reform—the general momentum has
continued until today. In line with the Dewatripont-Roland (1995) model, the tran-
sition process started with reforms like decollectivization that delivered enormous
welfare gains and created constituencies for more difficult reforms like restruc-
turing in the state sector.
Insufficient attention, however, has been given so far to this issue of partial
reform and the conditions under which it creates momentum or, on the contrary,
creates vested interests that block further reform. The existing theories of the polit-
ical economy of reform currently tend to be too abstract to treat this problem in a
sufficiently satisfactory way. One needs political-economic models with more
flesh to better understand the economic and political dynamics of sequencing.
Recent empirical research on China by Morduch and Sicular (1999) already gives
evidence that rents to bureaucrats increase with the pace of reforms, while the
benefits of reform are shared with the population at large.
The relevance of the Chinese gradualist experience is often dismissed because
of the dictatorial character of its regime. It is interesting to note, however, that,
despite the political regime, painful reforms have not been brutally imposed on the
population. On the contrary, both the sequencing and the design of reforms have
been tailored so as to benefit a majority and hurt only a minority. The choice of
dual-track price liberalization was in fact even designed to be Pareto-improving
and to protect existing rents (see Lau, Qian, and Roland, 2000). It is not clear
whether the Chinese reform process would have been politically infeasible if
China had been a democracy and whether any democratic system could have
sustained such a process. If anything, the absence of democracy has made it more
difficult to enforce private property rights and the rule of law and to encourage the
development of a newly developing private sector. Recent research (Che and Qian,
1998) suggests that the development of township and village enterprises was a
spontaneous response to the specific Chinese institutional situation with the
absence of the rule of law and sufficient safeguards against predatory government
behavior. (More on this below.)
One lesson that emerges from the transition experience is that the political
constraints to reform have been less strong in Central Europe, especially in the
countries close to Germany, compared with the former Soviet Union. (Yegor
Gaidar did not have the support that Leszek Balcerowicz or Vaclav Klaus had in
Poland and the Czech Republic.) Even when former Communist coalitions came
to power in Central Europe, they did not question the direction of reforms, only its
speed and its redistributive aspects. Why this striking difference in the importance
of political constraints to reform? This is clearly an area where further research is
needed.
In Roland (1997), I suggested that the geopolitical factor has played an impor-
tant role, a factor that was underestimated in the beginning of transition, certainly
by myself. Economists trying to understand transition have generally had the
vision of transition as a shift toward democracy and the market. If we take some
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geopolitical move, that is, the shift of Central Europe and the Baltic states to the
West. To populations in those countries, the single most important factor about
transition is the change from the status of a satellite country of the Soviet empire
to that of a country belonging to the western bloc or even the European Union.
Transition represents a unique historical opportunity for several nations to get
strongly anchored in Western Europe. Not only is this “anchoring” to the
European Union desired by nations of Central Europe, it also focuses expectations
and gives credibility to the political and economic process of transition. Entry in
the European Union implies adopting the political and economic system of the
West. The potential reward of belonging to the club of Western nations makes it
more worthwhile to undergo the cost of transition and thus to accept the latter
more easily. Moreover, the geopolitical factor increases the perceived cost of a
policy reversal since it implies the risk of being left out of the western club, a
perspective that many in Central Europe would view as disastrous.
This geopolitical factor may be strong enough, as a focal point, to explain why
countries from Central Europe did not suffer from the type of government
collapse, anarchy, and general diffusion of criminality, inside and outside govern-
ment, that Russia has been facing (see Roland and Verdier, 1999a and 1999b).
Ability to enforce the law and to protect property rights seems to be a first-order
effect in explaining why Central Europe recovered from their output fall while
Russia and other countries, not facing the prospect of entry to the European Union,
have experienced a continuous decline of output (see also Johnson, McMillan, and
Woodruff, 1999a, 1999b).
The geopolitical factor in Central European countries was reinforced by a
“transition tournament” between the Czech, Hungarian, and Polish governments
where each pretended to be the most advanced transition country in the hope of
attracting the bulk of foreign direct investment to the region. The incentives related
to the “prize” of such a tournament are strong enough for countries of that size to
create credibility for economic transformation. Countries that entered the transi-
tion race later, like Bulgaria and Romania, have little hope of catching up on the
more advanced countries, or even of pretending to do so, and thus have less possi-
bilities of attracting foreign direct investment.
To understand the strength of the geopolitical factor, compare the situation of
Central European countries to that of Russia, where this geopolitical factor is
absent. By contrast to the former, where transition is seen as a liberation from the
Soviet empire and access to the Western club of nations, transition is viewed in
Russia as a traumatic experience by large parts of the population. Indeed, transi-
tion represents the loss, not only of the Soviet empire, but also of territories, such
as the Ukraine and the Baltic states, which once belonged to Tsarist Russia. This
loss does not only mean a wound to Russian nationalist pride, but it implies uncer-
tainty for the families of those who have relatives among the millions of Russians
living in the former Soviet republics and who became “immigrants” in former
Soviet territories, often with the status of “second-class” citizen. The trauma of the
loss of superpower status, similar in a way to the trauma of Germany after World
War I, could be, to a certain extent, compensated for by economic gains from tran-
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Russians. No entry of Russia in the European Union is expected nor especially
desired. The size of the country implies that the impact of foreign direct invest-
ment is likely to be more diluted, thereby reducing the incentives to participate in
“transition tournaments.” It is thus no wonder that resistance to transition proved
much harder in the former Soviet Union, as witnessed by the greater difficulties in
hardening budget constraints of enterprises or of adopting stabilization measures.
Nor is it clear that no major policy reversal will take place or is expected to take
place.
If we believe the geopolitical factor played a major role in Central Europe,
then it would be seriously flawed to compare transition in Central Europe and
Russia without taking this factor into account. To understand the effect of political
constraints on the transition process, it is better to look at the experience of large
countries that must achieve transition by their own efforts without counting too
much on outside help. The comparison between Russia and China is of relevance
there, taking into account differences between those two big countries (political
regime, level of development, etc.).
If the hypothesis of the geopolitical factor explains the stronger resistance to
reform or smaller support in Russia and former CIS countries, it also implies that,
everything else equal, the cost of reversal of transition policies is much higher in
Central European policies than in Russia and the former CIS countries. In that
sense, the perceived sense of haste that existed in Central Europe to implement
reforms fast to achieve irreversibility may have been exaggerated.
This last observation is potentially important. Indeed, the political economy
theories of transition usually assume that the long-term economic outcome of
reforms are independent of the speed of their introduction. In reality, the speed of
liberalization and privatization does have important efficiency and distributive
implications. More important, the outcomes of liberalization and privatization
teach us something about the two perspectives.
Liberalization and the Output Fall
With hindsight, I would claim that the outcome of liberalization vindicates the
evolutionary-institutionalist perspective and that, on the basis of the transition
experience, this is the consensus view that has been developing in the academic
community. The important output fall that occurred after price liberalization in
Central and Eastern Europe was not predicted. Standard textbook economics
based on supply and demand at best would have predicted a low supply response
to liberalization, but not a negative one. The debate on the output fall was in the
beginning inspired mainly by the Washington consensus centered around macro-
economic policies, asking questions such as whether or not stabilization had been
too harsh. When Russia liberalized but failed to stabilize and nevertheless experi-
enced an output fall, it was clear that new answers were needed.
Two transition-specific answers have come up so far and have not yet been
refuted. One is the traditional double-marginalization idea from the industrial
organization literature. To the extent that central planning created monopoly-like
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competition does not play that role, liberalization induces a cascade of price
increases and output contraction along supply chains (Li, 1999). The other, newer
idea, is that of disorganization. That view takes seriously the idea that markets
have not yet been created when liberalization occurs. Due to bargaining ineffi-
ciencies or to a combination of investment specificity and search frictions related
to the prior absence of markets, existing output chains may suffer from acute
disruption where the efficiency gains reaped by the producers, who exit the chain,
do not compensate the disruption losses for the other producers in the output chain
(Blanchard and Kremer, 1997; Roland and Verdier, 1999b). The ensuing macro-
economic fall in GDP and welfare losses can be very important. These models are
de facto inspired by the evolutionary-institutionalist perspective.
The relevance of the evolutionary-institutionalist perspective appears even
more if we address the question of whether the output fall was an inevitable by-
product of liberalization. Here, the Chinese experience is again helpful because it
gives a negative answer to that question. A transition-specific institution has been
created to prevent the output fall associated with liberalization: it is the dual-track
liberalization. The dual-track liberalization has several interesting properties.
Prices are liberalized at the margin so that the market information obtained from
price liberalization is the same as what would be obtained under full price liberal-
ization. In the absence of preexisting markets, the most interesting properties of
the dual track are (1) that it allows, by construction, the achievement of Pareto-
improving gains from liberalization, which is interesting from the political
economy point of view because it is a way of overcoming potential resistance to
price liberalization due to its distributive effects; and (2) also by construction, it
prevents the output fall by maintaining past contractual obligations from the plan.
It is in a way surprising to observe not only that the dual-track approach had
not been proposed by academic economists in the context of transition (in Eastern
Europe at least) but also that it took several years before economists started to
understand the advantages of the dual-track system (see Byrd, 1991; Sicular, 1988;
Lau, Qian, and Roland, 1997 and 2000; Li, 1999). While the dual track has worked
well in China, further research is needed to understand some important aspects of
the dual track, such as how it can be enforced credibly and prevent the ratchet
effect. This may also help us understand why dual-track liberalization was not
applied in Eastern Europe and the countries of the former Soviet Union.
If we ignore politics, it is possible to argue that the dual-track liberalization
could have been applied in the context of the Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance (CMEA) trade. The CMEA breakdown (as well as the breakup of the
Soviet Union) has been considered the single most important explanatory factor
for the general fall of output in the region (see, for example, Rodrik, 1994), but it
has generally been perceived as an exogenous shock. The breakdown of CMEA,
however, was not exogenous. It was decided in early 1990, when the Czechoslovak
and the Polish governments insisted on regaining their freedom of export with
respect to CMEA agreements. The Soviets at that time responded by insisting that
imports from the Soviet Union would from 1991 onward be paid at world prices
and in hard currency. From the economic point of view, it would have been better,
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CMEA countries to avoid the strong trade disruption of 1991.
However, here again politics and the geopolitical factor have played an impor-
tant role. Individual Central European countries wanted to leave the Soviet bloc as
quickly as possible and to be the first to knock at the door of the European Union.
The CMEA breakdown was thus an economic consequence of the political will
prevailing in Central European countries to leave the Soviet bloc.
One may argue that the dual-track approach could not have been implemented
in the former Soviet Union and Russia because of the government collapse that
followed the implosion of communism after the failed putsch of 1991. As shown
by Roland and Verdier (1999a), however, the dual-track system itself can be seen
as an instrument to prevent government collapse in a credible way. Again, careful
research is needed to understand whether conditions existed to implement and
enforce the dual-track system itself in a credible way.
Government Collapse
Another area where the evolutionary-institutionalist perspective is vindicated
and where a consensus view has been developing fast within the academic
community, albeit with strong differences in emphasis, relates to the effects of
government collapse, mainly in many CIS countries. Government collapse was not
an important concern in the Washington consensus view. The concern was mainly
to cut down the size of government and to “get the state out of the economy.”
Government collapse would have been seen as a second-best option where
markets would emerge at full speed but there may be too few public goods—a
lesser evil compared to the evils of communism. The emergence of organized
crime, its predatory racketeering activities, and Mafia-related internal corruption
of government have had deleterious effects on private sector growth. Again, this
evolution was not predicted and was strongly underestimated. As of today, the
Mafia is still seen by many as a suboptimal contract enforcement agency.
Also, the more comprehensive view of institutions of the evolutionary-
institutionalist perspective seems to be vindicated given the experience of govern-
ment collapse. While it is always possible to claim for each transition country that
there were shortcomings in the legal framework, in Russia, one cannot claim that
legal reform was neglected. Many important laws were adopted, often with the
help of prominent scholars—be they corporate laws, commercial laws, or financial
regulations. Nevertheless, law enforcement is a real problem and confidence in
courts is lower in Russia than in Central Europe (see, for example, Black,
Kraakman, and Tarassova, 2000; Johnson, McMillan, and Woodruff, 1999b). The
adequate social norms for a market economy have not yet emerged, and the level
of business trust remains low.
Privatization
The experience with privatization also tends to vindicate the evolutionary-
institutionalist perspective against the Washington consensus view. The view,
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stripping by incumbent managers, has been refuted by reality as many managers
in state-owned enterprises did show early signs of restructuring. The doomsday
predictions on the consequences of too low a speed did not materialize in coun-
tries like Poland and Hungary where privatization took place in a gradual way. The
prediction of generalized asset stripping was wrong. It made sense for good
managers to try to attract private investors and to engage in early defensive restruc-
turing for that purpose. Also, both theory and evidence show the importance of
using privatization to achieve efficient matching of managers and assets (see, for
example Bolton, and Roland, 1992; Barberis and others, 1996). Insider privatiza-
tion did not achieve that objective. Insider privatization did not in general lead to
significant improvement in performance (see, for example, Frydman and others,
2000), whereas the Washington consensus view claimed that any privatization was
always better than no privatization.5 Moreover, vested interests created by insider
privatization may have made ulterior privatization more difficult to achieve
(Aghion and Blanchard, 1998) and may have also maintained or aggravated the
soft budget constraint syndrome in firms privatized to insiders (Debande and
Friebel, 1995). This soft budget constraint syndrome usually takes the form of tax
arrears (Schaffer, 1998). Further research should determine the extent to which the
combination of free distribution of assets and tax erosion in Russia has reinforced
tendencies to government collapse.
In China, we have seen the emergence of a very original institution: the TVEs
owned by township and village governments. The Washington consensus view
cannot make sense of TVEs, except to claim that they are pseudo-private enter-
prises, which we know is not the case. Theories developed in the transition litera-
ture suggest that TVEs operate under conditions of hard budget constraints, which
are very important for efficiency (Qian and Roland, 1996 and 1998), and also that,
because of the public goods they contribute to create in their activity, they are
more protected from government predation than private firms in China (Che and
Qian, 1998).
Organization of Government
The Chinese experience, where privatization remained taboo until recently,
also shows the importance of reform in the organization of government with the
decentralization of government and the development of different forms of compe-
tition between local governments that can be made to work in favor of market
development. Also, the fiscal federalism arrangements, which make local govern-
ments residual claimants on any increase in the tax base, creates partial alignment
of interests of bureaucrats with the development of markets and entrepreneurship
(on all this, see Qian, 1999). In Russia, reform of the organization of government
was relatively neglected, as the main focus of reform was implementation of mass
privatization.
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5This does not mean that no form of privatization had a positive effect. For recent studies, see
Havrylyshyn and McGettigan (2000), and Djankov and Murrell (2000).With hindsight, reform of government with the purpose of building stable
constituencies for reform should have been a priority of reform sequencing in
Russia. The unexpected collapse of communism in 1991 created a formidable
opportunity to create a democratic constitution with appropriate separation of
powers and checks and balances between branches of government as well as
between the center and provinces. Legitimate and accountable institutions coming
out of a constitutional process would have helped to build more solid constituen-
cies for reform and create a government structure with legitimate authority. There
is no clear view among researchers about what should be the best constitution for
Russia. Since legitimacy is fundamental, the appropriate constitution should not
necessarily result from a blueprint but must be the result of a serious consensus-
building deliberative process, as was the case with the successful democratic tran-
sition in Spain. As of today, government reform is still a priority in Russia, but the
initial aspirations to democracy have been strongly dampened by the turmoil of
transition under Yeltsin.
Soft Budget Constraints
A final difference we will mention between the Washington consensus view
and the evolutionary-institutionalist perspective concerns the question of soft
budget constraints. Here the dominant thought was that hardening budget
constraints was only a matter of exogenous choice by policymakers without
thinking about the institutional factors or the factors in the environment of firms
that contributed to credibly harden the budget constraint of firms: privatization,
demonopolization, government reform, banking reform, and so forth. The subsis-
tence of soft budget constraints in different forms, even in the advanced transition
countries, shows that hardening budget constraints is not just a matter of political
will but a matter of devising institutional mechanisms that create credibility for
hardening. While there has been quite a body of theoretical work on soft budget
constraints, empirical work on the issue is only beginning and should be a priority
in research.
Despite the lack of direct empirical tests, the general evidence on enterprise
behavior suggests a difference in enterprise behavior with a rapid hardening of
budget constraints in the accession countries and persistence of soft budget
constraints in most other countries. Here again, the geopolitical factor may have
played an important role in shaping expectations early on in accession countries.
Further research should give us a clearer picture of the hardening of budget
constraints.
III. Conclusion
The broad assessment developed above tends to show, on the basis of the tran-
sition experience, that the evolutionary-institutionalist perspective is more
complete and adequate than the Washington consensus view. There is an
increasing consensus among professional economists that the “Washington
consensus” view with its so-called trinity of transition (liberalization, stabilization,
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sional economists do not deny the need to liberalize, stabilize, and privatize, they
increasingly recognize that these policies cannot achieve their goals without the
existence of institutional underpinnings of capitalism appropriate to the specific
conditions of each country. In practice, there has been a growing convergence
within the academic community, if not a consensus, toward the evolutionary-
institutionalist perspective.6
While the above discussion has attempted to propose a synthesis of the main
lessons of transition, an important word of caution is necessary, in line with the
evolutionary-institutionalist perspective. While general policy conclusions can be
drawn from theory and empirical research on transition—the point is of course
valid beyond transition—there is still a long distance between general policy
conclusions and direct policy recommendations. While we can draw general
lessons from the economic failures of transition in Russia, in the 1990s for
example, it is still quite a different matter to draw a complete and convincing
counterfactual of how things could have evolved, given the conditions of deci-
sionmaking.
Finally, I would like to draw attention to two areas that, with hindsight, have
appeared important for transition, but on which relatively little research has been
done. The first one relates to inequality of wealth and income. While the increase
in inequality of income and wealth was predicted, the patterns of increasing
inequality are quite different across countries (Milanovic, 1998; Garner and
Terrell, 1998; Keane and Prasad, 2000). What are the political and economic
effects of this increase in inequality? While this is a general question for
economics (Persson and Tabellini, 1994), it is particularly relevant in the case of
transition. In particular, one would like to go beyond the median voter model and
understand better the political channels through which an increase in inequality
affects political decision making: the relative role of electoral politics and special
interest politics, the policy and political coalition formation process, and so forth.
The second theme is that of social behavior, social norms, and social capital.
The question of social norms is a general and important question for social
science, and this is an area that has been under-researched by economists at least
during the transition process. An obvious route of investigation that has not been
used in formal analysis of transition processes so far, at least to my knowledge, is
the use of evolutionary game models. Within the evolutionary-institutionalist
perspective, this seems a natural route to take, given the usefulness of evolutionary
game theory in selecting equilibria.
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6It is interesting to note from that point of view that at the Fifth Nobel Symposium in Economics
devoted to the economics of transition, out of six sessions, only one was devoted to macroeconomic devel-
opments while there were five sessions on institutions, three of which were devoted to the organization of
government and two on contracts.REFERENCES
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